Fresh legal debate has emerged over the conviction of TikTok content creator Camilla Alhassan after a Ghanaian lawyer, Kwaku Azar questioned the legal basis of the offence under which she was prosecuted, arguing that the Ghana Police Service may have relied on considerations not contained in the Criminal Offences Act.

The discussion follows the conviction and one-year custodial sentence imposed by an Accra Circuit Court after Camilla Alhassan pleaded guilty to charges including offensive conduct and publication of false news over videos she posted on social media concerning President John Dramani Mahama.

Following the judgment, the Ghana Police Service stated that the TikToker’s comments were “capable of disturbing public peace and undermining national cohesion.”

However, the legal analysis argues that Section 207 of the Criminal Offences Act, which creates the offence of offensive conduct conducive to breaches of the peace, sets out specific legal requirements that must be established before a conviction can be sustained.

According to Kwaku Azar, the offence is not a general prohibition against speech that authorities consider offensive, disturbing or harmful to national unity.

He explained that Parliament deliberately created a narrowly defined offence with clearly identifiable legal elements.

The first requirement, he noted, concerns place.

Under Section 207, the threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour must occur in a public place or at a public meeting.

According to the legal interpretation, the location where the alleged conduct occurred forms an essential ingredient of the offence and must therefore be established by the prosecution.

The second requirement relates to the nature of the conduct itself.

The prosecution must prove that the words used were threatening, abusive or insulting within the meaning of the law.

The lawyer argues that controversial political statements, false allegations, offensive opinions or remarks considered to be in poor taste do not automatically satisfy this legal requirement simply because they provoke public criticism.

The third and most important requirement, according to the legal analysis, is what is described as the breach-of-the-peace nexus.

Section 207 requires prosecutors to establish either that the accused intended to provoke a breach of the peace or that the words were used in circumstances where a breach of the peace was likely to occur.

It is on this point that the lawyer believes the Police explanation raises important legal questions.

He argues that the Police statement referred to comments being “capable of disturbing public peace,” whereas the statute itself speaks of circumstances in which a breach of the peace is likely or where there was an intent to provoke such a breach.

According to him, there is an important legal distinction between something being merely capable of causing disturbance and it being objectively likely to result in a breach of the peace.

He further questioned the Police reference to “undermining national cohesion,” arguing that although national cohesion is an important public objective, the phrase does not appear as an element of the offence created under Section 207.

The lawyer contends that criminal liability must be based strictly on the wording enacted by Parliament rather than broader policy considerations.

He warned that expanding the interpretation of narrowly drafted criminal offences could create uncertainty regarding freedom of expression and potentially allow speech to be criminalised on grounds not expressly provided by law.

According to the legal opinion, the criminal justice system should resist attempts to stretch public-order offences to cover statements that are merely offensive, inflammatory or socially irresponsible unless they satisfy every element required by statute.

The lawyer emphasised that his argument should not be interpreted as defending or endorsing the substance of Camilla Alhassan’s remarks.

He stated that the TikToker’s comments had no social value and should not be celebrated.

Nevertheless, he maintained that criminal courts must determine guilt based on whether the prosecution has proved each statutory element beyond the required legal standard rather than on the offensiveness or moral worth of the speech.

He concluded that while citizens may strongly condemn irresponsible public statements, moral disapproval alone cannot substitute for proof of the legal ingredients established by Parliament under Section 207 of the Criminal Offences Act.